Empirical research consistently finds that people with high education have more liberal immigration attitudes. To what extent this relationship reflects a causal effect of education is, however, largely unknown. We rely on the staggered introduction of a major Norwegian education reform to get exogenous variation in respondents' level of education. The reform lifted the bottom of the education distribution by increasing the compulsory years of education by two years. We find no significant differences in immigration attitudes between those who were educated in the old and the new education system. Our results suggest that if education has a causal effect on immigration attitudes, it is likely to operate on other education margins. * We would like to thank seminar participants at the Institute for Social Research, Frisch Center for Economic Research, and University of Bergen for comments on a previous draft of the paper. Funding from the Research Council of Norway is acknowledged (grant no. 270687 
education and immigration attitudes
Does staying longer in school cause more liberal views on immigration? A number of studies find a positive association between education and liberal views of immigration and immigrants, 1 which has been interpreted in several ways. The cognitive framework argues that more education causes higher levels of tolerance towards cultural diversity (Quinley and Glock 1979; Bobo and Licari 1989; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Van der Waal et al. 2010) . In one version of this argument, Quinley and Glock (1979) claim that formal education provides people with cognitive skills to detect prejudice, understand its dangers, and reject it. Another version emphasizes how receiving more education might correct misperceptions and misinformation about the roots of majority-minority differences and about the actual levels of immigration (Strabac 2011). 2 The labor market framework contends that low-educated citizens are more likely to compete with immigrants on the labor market and to experience potentially negative externalities from immigration on their workplaces, neighborhoods, and schools. These conflicts There is, however, scant evidence of to what degree the education gap reflects causal effects of education or mainly reflects selection into education. Recent empirical work on, for example, the relationship between education and voter turnout suggests that selection explains a large part of the correlation between education and the propensity to vote (Persson 2015) . In a similar manner, childhood factors-such as parental political socialization and socio-economic resources, neighborhood socialization and opportunities, and personality traits-might explain both immigration attitudes and level of education. As Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014, 241) conclude in their review of the immigration attitudes literature, "quasi-experimental manipulation of education levels in the study of immigration attitudes would be of substantial value in unpacking the causal mechanisms that underpin the education effect."
In this short article, we provide such a causal assessment of the link between education and liberal immigration views. We do so by exploiting a comprehensive education reform in Norway that extended compulsory schooling from seven to nine years. The key to our approach is that the reform was implemented in a staggered fashion across the around 400 municipalities, which creates plausibly exogenous variation in levels of education across cohorts within municipalities. In this note we combine data on the municipal timing of the education reform with survey data that includes information on the respondents' municipality of upbringing as well as their immigration attitudes when they were in their 50s. Using this data we estimate the effect of being educated under the new school system versus the old school system. Due to the ethnic and religious homogeneity of Norway in the 50s and 60s, all respondents grew up in homogenous contexts. Diversity might be more difficult to handle when you are less used to it (Hopkins 2010) , implying that the type of reform we study might plausibly have effects on immigration attitudes in our setting. 3 Our results helps understanding to what degree the education gap in views on immigration is causal or due to selection. Importantly, the variation provided by the reform mainly identifies an education effect that is not mixed with the effect that education may have on immigration attitudes through labor market competition or neighborhood effects. The education reform lifted the bottom of the education distribution: those who previously completed only seven years of education were now forced to take at least nine years of education.
The reform did not, however, move many people into higher education (Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage 2010, 492 ) and consequently into high-skill occupations, where immigrants are complements rather than competitors on the labour market (see Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013) . The reform therefore had limited effect on the exposure to labor market competition from immigrants. An effect of the reform will thus mainly be due to an increase in years spent at school, which will reflect the cognitive and informational mechanisms between education and immigration attitudes.
To our knowledge, only two previous studies have studied the effect of educational reforms on immigration attitudes using a causal inference framework (d'Hombres and Nunziata 2016; Cavaillé and Marshall 2017) . These papers exploit cross-country variation in the timing of national-level educational reforms in Europe, combined with survey data from the European Social Survey, to study attitudes to immigration.
Both studies document a positive effect of education; yet, Cavaillé and Marshall (2017) find important variation in the effect. Most notably, their results show a small and insignificant effect in Sweden, which implemented the reform at about the same time as Norway. Our approach complements these studies but has several additional benefits.
We compare municipalities within the same institutional and cultural environment and an, at the time, small immigrant population, which was quite evenly spread across the country. There is therefore little reason to believe that the timing of the educational reform across municipalities was in any way connected to trends in immigrant attitudes. It also has the benefit that by using subnational variation across municipalities in the timing of the same school reform, we can control for general cohort effects. This control alleviates the concern that we conflate the effect of the education reform with cohort trends in views of immigration. In contrast, Cavaillé and Marshall (2017) ignore that the Swedish education reform was implemented in staggered fashion across municipalities (Holmlund 2008).
In line with the selection effect story, we find no evidence of an effect of the education reform on immigration attitudes. Our coefficient estimates are not only statistically insignificant, they are also close to zero in substantive terms. Although our results suggest that expansions of compulsory education does not change immigration attitudes, they are not informative about causal effects from manipulations of other education margins. For instance, it is possible that reforms which expand access to higher education might causally affect immigration attitudes. Moreover, the results in d' Hombres and Nunziata (2016) and Cavaillé and Marshall (2017) suggest that effects of education reforms on immigration attitudes are heterogeneous across countries.
Before we return to these discussions in the concluding remarks, we present the education reform and the empirical strategy in the next section and the empirical results in the ensuing section.
research design
We exploit a large-scale Norwegian reform passed in 1959 that required all Norwegian municipalities to increase compulsory schooling from seven to nine years. Crucially, however, the year of the implementation was left to the municipalities, leading the reform to be introduced in a staggered fashion between 1959 and 1972. In the Online Appendix A.1, we describe the reform in more detail and review the literature on the causal effects of the reform on citizen's education and socio-economic outcomes in adulthood. We also show that the timing of the reform is plausibly exogenous.
Using the education reform, the crux of our empirical design is to compare the difference in attitudes between adjacent cohorts within the same municipality, where some cohorts were educated in the old and some in the new education system. We study the cohorts born between 1947 -1958 (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005 , which ensures that we have within-municipality variation in what school system the respondents faced.
To capture the causal effect of education, induced by the education reform, we use two different versions of fixed-effects regression models. The first model takes the following form:
where i, c, m, and t indexes individuals, birth cohort, municipality, and survey year, respectively. New system is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the reform was implemented in the year the respondent started eighth grade, i.e., the respondent were educated in the new school system. In this specification, we compare the attitudes between respondents who were and were not exposed to the reform within the same cohort. The birth cohort fixed effects, γ c , remove general cohort effects in immigration attitudes. In addition, the survey year fixed effects σ s remove common time trends in attitudes. The exogenous vector of covariates X i contains a dummy for female, as well as a set of dummy variables for whether the individual grew up in a central, suburban, or rural neighborhood (see Online Appendix A.2 for details). The covariates are not necessary for identification but are included to improve precision. 4 Standard errors are clustered on municipalities, m, since the reform was implemented at the municipal level.
Despite the results indicating that the timing of reform was exogenous to observable characteristics of the municipalities, one might still worry about average differences in immigration attitudes between early and late adopters of the reform. The second version of the model therefore additionally includes municipality fixed effects:
In this model we add municipality fixed effects, η m , which implies that we identify the reform from the within-municipality variation, i.e., we identify the effect from variation in the year of implementation. With municipality and cohort fixed effect, this model is in essence a difference-in-differences model where α is the average treatment effect of the reform, assuming that there are no other events that simultaneously influenced the treated cohorts and immigration attitudes. Monday. The Progress Party is the only party with representation in the Norwegian parliament which explicitly state in their party program that they want to reduce immigration. As with the immigration attitudes, we code those answering "would not vote" and "don't know" as zero.
5 First, we do not find a relationship between the reform and self-reported economic situation in childhood (see Table A -6) . Second, we find that respondents educated in the new system are more likely to have education beyond the lowest level of education, higher household income, and perceive their current economic situation as being "above average" (see Table A -7) . The effect of the reform on level of education could potentially be the first stage in an IV estimation of the effect of years of education on immigration attitudes, by using the reform as an instrumental variable (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2008) . Unfortunately, the education level categories in Norsk Monitor do not discriminate well between the lower education levels before and after the reform: The question on level of education has five answer categories. The lowest category pools together respondents with seven (primary education, "Folkeskole") and eight years of education (continuation school, "Framhaldskole"), while the second lowest level of education pools together respondents with nine (middle school, "ungdomsskole") and ten years of education (academic track, "realskole"). This classification problem weakens the relationship between the reform and years of education, and results in a first stage which is too weak to avoid serious weak instrument bias in the second stage (see columns 3 and 4 in Table A-7). We therefore continue with the reduced form estimate of the reform on immigration attitudes. In size, however, the estimated effect of the reform on years of education (.2 with and without the municipality fixed effects) is similar to the effects reported in the literature (.25 in Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage 2010 As in previous research, we find a strong positive correlation between education and more liberal immigration attitudes (see Table A -9) . Having more than primary education is associated with being half a standard deviation more liberal on the immigration attitude index, as well as having about 7 percentage points lower probability of intending to vote for the Progress Party. As pointed out above, however, these correlations cannot be interpreted as causal, since they may reflect characteristics of the individual that has both an impact on educational level and immigration attitudes.
We therefore turn to the main analysis, where we evaluate the causal effect of the education reform on views of immigration.
a null effect of extending compulsory education
To provide graphical evidence of our empirical strategy and results, Figure 1 This conclusion also holds when we more rigorously estimate the effect of education on immigration attitudes and vote choice using Equations 1 and 2 above.
The coefficients on the education reform, along with 95 percent confidence intervals are plotted in Figure 2 (see Table A -10 for the full regression results). The results mirror Figure 1 and are thus easy to summarize. First, the coefficients are statistically insignificant and substantively small in size. Even if we were to disregard the confidence intervals, the point estimate in, for instance the top row, suggest an effect of one-twentyfifth of a standard deviation on immigration attitudes. Second, the point estimates do not show a consistent direction of effects. We find both positively and negatively signed coefficients for being educated in the new school system. 7 Third, the standard errors are also small, which indicates that the null effect is precisely estimated. Together, the insignificant effects, the varying direction of the effects, and the in general small sizes of the coefficients, all point in the direction that there is no causal impact of the educational reform on immigration attitudes. concluding remarks: effects along other education margins?
In this study, we find no causal effects of a large-scale Norwegian education reform on immigration attitudes and anti-immigration voting. The reform increased the level of formal education, in particular among the low educated. Our results consequently suggest caution when interpreting the commonly found positive association between level of education and liberal immigration attitudes. One interpretation of our null results is that the correlation between education and immigration attitudes is purely spurious and reflects selection into education. However, since the reform mainly affected those with low levels of education, we cannot rule out that an education reform which manipulates other education margins, such as the expansion of higher education, induces individuals to hold more liberal immigration attitudes. One reason might be that the cognitive effects of formal education on the ability to reject prejudice works for those with medium or high levels of education. 
A.1 The education reform
The education reform had two main components (see Lie 1973a,b; Lindbekk 1993) . The first and most important component was that the reform forced the municipalities to extend compulsory schooling from seven to nine years. The starting age was kept unchanged at age seven. Prior to the reform, the students had four choices after completing the compulsory seven years: an academic track which qualified the student for high school; a vocational track; a continuation school track; or leave school. After the reform, the continuation school track was closed down and all students completed six years of primary school and three years of middle school before they could leave school. The second component was a change from a selective to a more comprehensive type of schooling, and implied a standardization of the curriculum.
The aim of the reform, which was implemented by a Social Democratic majority government, was to reduce the disparities in primary education between urban and rural areas. The reform forced the municipalities to implement the changes in their primary education; nevertheless, the exact timing of the implementation was left to the municipalities. Even though the Norwegian Parliament passed the reform in 1959, it was implemented locally over the period from 1959 to 1972. 9 To avoid implementation differences between municipalities with different levels of financial resources, the national government funded most of the reform. 10
To be able to use the reform as a natural experiment, we need that the reform was plausibly exogenous to other changes in the municipalities that might influence immigration attitudes. Figure A-1 illustrates graphically the speed and geographic spread in the implementation of the reform. In panel (a), we show that the year of adoption varied considerably across municipalities, whereas in panel (b) we display that the timing of the implementation was spread out geographically. Moreover, previous research has found that the timing of the reform implementation was uncorrelated with observable characteristics of the municipalities, including average earnings, taxable income and educational levels, average age of the population, region, or the municipality size (Lie 1973b,a; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005) . The implementation was instead a "complex adoption process," where particularly effective local administrators played an important role Salvanes 2008, 1031) . This process led to a staggered implementation of the reform, which we exploit to construct a treatment group which were educated in the new system and a control group which were educated in the old system.
Besides knowing that the reform was uncorrelated with observable characteristics, we also know that the reform the reform increased the educational level for around thirteen percent of the population (Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage 2010) . According to Aakvik and co-authors' (2010: 
A.2.1 Norsk Monitor
Norsk Monitor (NM) is a large sociocultural study which has been conducted biannually since 1985. The data is collected through a short telephone interview and a subsequent self-completed mail questionnaire. The sample is drawn from the population above 15 years old and consist of around 4,000 net respondents in each wave, with a new sample for each wave. The sampling is a simple random sample from telephone directories (landline and cell). We use the 2005-2013 biannual waves. The response rate by wave ranges from 7 to 4 percent, implying that one might think of the sample as a type of convenience sample that is often used in experimental research.
The low response rates might be a cause of worry, at least for external validity. To examine the response rate bias in NM, Hellevik (2016) presents a range of analyses comparing estimates from NM to estimates from surveys with much higher response rates and to estimates from administrative data from Statistics Norway. He concludes that the bias for these variables are low. For our purpose, the main concern is whether the response rate is correlated with treatment status, which would be the case if the education reform had an effect on willingness to participate in surveys. We find, however, no significant correlation between treatment status and number of responses per municipality, as we detail in Section A.2.3 below.
A.2.2 Municipality of upbringing and measurement error
To identify the respondents that are educated in the old and the new system, we use information about municipality of upbringing and the year of birth. We use the To identify year of birth, we subtract the stated age from the year the survey was conducted (Norwegian enrollment rules follow year of birth). Because municipality of upbringing is based on recall, there is potentially measurement error in this variable.
Measurement error in the independent variable may bias our results towards zero. It is therefore reassuring that we, in line with previous research, find treatment effects on education, household income, and perceived economic situation (see Table A-7) . We can, however, also compare the available information from the survey to information from official resources (Statistics Norway) to check whether measurement error in this variable seems to be an important problem. We do so in two ways.
First, we compare the response rate to the municipality of upbringing question to other questions about current and past place of living. Using our sample, Q87
(municipality of upbringing) has 4,370 non-missing answers (out of 4,920). There is a companion question Q88, clearly less likely to suffer from recall bias, where the respondent is asked to characterize the centrality of their place of upbringing (Q88A). 4,724 people characterize their place of upbringing (Q88A). Thus, the level of missingness is not vastly different on these two questions. Other information that should be more easy to remember in the same set of questions is Q89: "Have you lived in your current municipality all your life or have you moved here after having lived in a different municipality" and Q93: "Do you live on a farm today". They have non-missing responses of 4,837 and 4,737 respectively. There is therefore no large differences between the response rate on the question of municipality of upbringing and other related questions about municipality of upbringing or residence.
Second, in the 1970 census, Statistics Norway include a binary measure of whether the census unit in which an individual resided was densely or sparsely populated, which we compare to the survey respondents' characterization of their place of upbringing. We do so in the following way. First, using the 1970 census, we calculate the share of the population in each municipality that lives in densely populated areas. 11
Next, we merge this variable with our survey data based on the respondents' stated plots the means of the x-and y-axis variables within each bin. There is an extremely tight relationship between respondents' reporting that they grew up in a non-rural area (y-axis) and the share of the population in a municipality living in dense areas.
With a regression coefficient of .98, there is almost a perfect one-to-one correspondence between the two measures. Moreover, as Table A-1 displays, there is no difference in this relationship between respondents in the new and old education system.
Together, the evidence presented indicates that the problem with measurement error in the municipality of upbringing is not severe: the response rate to this question Table A -1: OLS regression of the association between a census-based measure of the share of the municipal population living in densely populated areas and the share of respondents reporting that they grew up in a non-rural area (dependent variable)
Reported upbring.
(1) is high compared to similar questions; moreover, the correspondence between how the respondents characterize their municipality of upbringing and how Statistics Norway characterize them is high.
A.2.3 Number of responses
We use the variation in the timing of municipalities' implementation of the reform to estimate the effect of the education reform (see Equation 1 and Equation 2 in the article).
To see if there is any measurement error connected to a change in number of responses before and after the reform, we calculate the mean number of responses within each municipality before and after the reform and run a regression estimating an effect of the reform on these number of responses. Before the reform, each municipality had on average 5.6 observations; after the reform, each municipality had on average 7.1
observations. Specifically, if we regress the number of municipality-level responses on the reform, the coefficient on the reform is an insignificant increase of 1.5 (SE = Table A -10 before and after the reform per municipality, the same picture emerges:
the mean number of missing before the reform is .23, after the reform it is .26 and the difference of .03 is insignificant (SE = .05, p = .542). Together, there is consequently a negligible difference in response rates for respondents educated in the old and the new system. The low average number of observations per municipality before and after the reform might still be a concern since the variation we are using is somewhat limited. However, we do find significant effects on other outcomes (see e.g. A-7), which implies that we have sufficient variation to identify differences between the groups.
A.2.4 Dependent variables
To measure the dependent variables, we use the five different questions about immigrant attitudes referred below. The assigned value in the dummy variables used in the analysis is indicated in parenthesis. Table A 
A.2.5 Covariates and other variables used in the analyses
The covariates included in the regressions are a dummy for female (Q309) and a set of dummies for the type of neighborhood in which the respondent grew up (Q88A, see also Table ? ? above). Specifically, the survey item asks: "How would you characterize the place where you grew up?" It has the following response categories: (1) city, central district; (2) city, outer district; (3) city suburb; (4) town, central district; (5) town, outer district; (6) town suburb; (7) small town; (8) village; (9) rural area. We collapse 2 and 3 into one category, 5 and 6 into one category, and create a no-response category before we create a set of dummy variables based on the survey item. Where noted in the regression tables, we include this set of dummy variables.
Additional variables that are used in the analysis include education (V32, "What is your highest level of completed education"), household income (Q291, "What would you estimate your household's gross income to be per year?") 12 , economic situation (Q67, "When you compare yourself to other Norwegians, how is your economic situation?") 13 , and childhood economic situation (Q69, "When you look back at your upbringing, how was your family's economic situation?"). 14
A.2.6 Descriptive statistics for all variables
The descriptive statistics for all variables are provided in Table A -3 on the next page.
We see in Table A-3 that 2.6 percent of the sample reports an education level below middle school and lower secondary academic track. After the reform, there should be no respondents in this category. In our sample 28 respondents (1.2 percent) in the treatment group report that they had primary or continuation school, which is a minor deviance. 96 respondents (3.9 percent) in the control group report the same level of schooling. This is lower than the share with only primary level schooling reported in 12 100,000 brackets up to 1,000,000, then a category for "1 million or more". 13 The answer categories are: much worse than average, somewhat worse than average, as the average, somewhat better than average, much better than average.
14 Answer categories: "The family had at times little money, with worries about how one should make ends meet"; "The family had sufficient funds if one were careful with how the money was spent"; "The family had a generous economy with opportunities to acquire what one needed and wanted". 
A.3 Factor analysis of immigration attitudes
In this section we describe the construction of the factor score index. The answer categories for these items have different scales: some between zero and two, some either zero or one. We have transformed the variables into dummy variables indicating more liberal answers. We code those answering "don't know" and "impossible to choose" as zero to avoid conditioning the sample on an endogneous variable (for instance, education might affect the probability of choosing these categories). The exact wording and coding of the survey items are detailed in the section A.2. Table   A -2 shows the proportion of the respondents who give a liberal answer to each of the items.
Ee use factor analysis (FA) to estimate where the respondents fall on the latent immigration attitude scale, ranging from restrictive to liberal. Since our variables are dichotomous, we use a correlation matrix with tetrachoric correlation coefficients to estimate the factor loadings. All the five items load heavily on one common factor, as shown in Table A -5. 15 From the factor analysis we calculate the standardized factor score variable (with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). This immigration attitudes index will serve as our main dependent variable. Additionally, to make sure that our results are not driven by our factor analysis, we create an alternative index in which we take the proportion of positive answers to the five items for each respondent.
For both of these indices, a higher values means that the respondent has more liberal views on immigration.
15 The Eigenvalue for the first factor is 3.4 and for the second it is 0.07. We thus retain one factor. A.4 The reform and childhood economic situation The dependent variables are the based on the survey question "When you think back on your childhood, how was the financial situation of your family? Which one of the following descriptions best fit the situation when you were 10-15 years if age? 1) We had financial difficulties at times, with concerns about how to make it, 2) We had a decent financial situation, as long as we spend out money carefully, 3) We had a good financial situation and could buy what we needed and wanted" Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on municipalities are in parentheses and P-values in italics. All models include controls for gender and type of neighborhood during upbringing.
A.5 Effects of the reform on education and income The education variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports a higher level of education than completed primary school (Folkeskole) or continuation school (Framhaldskole). Log household income is log of self-reported household income. Economic situation is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent answers "somewhat better than average" or "much better than average" on the question "When you compare yourself to other Norwegians, how is your economic situation?" Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on municipalities are in parentheses and P-values in italics. All models include controls for gender and type of neighborhood during upbringing.
A.6 T-test of differences in immigration attitudes
Table A-8: T-test of differences in immigration attitudes between respondents exposed and unexposed to the education reform (within cohorts). See also Figure 1 in the main text.
Cohort Mean (NS = 0) Mean (NS = 1) Abs. diff. P-value N (NS = 0) N (NS = 1) NS stands for "new system", i.e., whether the respondents are unexposed (0) or exposed (1) to the education reform. Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on municipalities are in parentheses and P-values in italics. All models include controls for gender and type of neighborhood during upbringing.
A.7 Correlation between education and immigration attitudes
A.8 OLS regression results of the effect of the reform on immigration attitudes Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on municipalities are in parentheses and P-values in italics. All models include controls for gender and type of neighborhood during upbringing. Higher values on the immigration attitude index means more liberal. "FA" refers to the factor analysis index, whereas "Prop." refers to the proportion index (see the text for details). "Frp" is Norwegian Progress Party.
A.9 The main regression results in Table A -10 but without covariates A.10 Regression results for individual survey items See the section "The Norsk Monitor surveys" for question wordings. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on municipalities are in parentheses and P-values in italics. All models include controls for gender and type of neighborhood during upbringing.
